Part 4
Civil society support for military efforts

10 Further developing total defence for civil society support for military efforts

As announced in Proposition 87 to the Storting (2023–2024) The Norwegian Defence Pledge – Long-term Defence Plan 2025–2036, the Government will further develop a total defence system that is more active in day-to-day life and prepared for war.

In war, the Norwegian Armed Forces will not be able to provide the same assistance to civil authorities as during peacetime, because the Armed Forces will be tied up with military tasks. In such situations, allied and national military forces will also have a significant need for civil support, including deliveries of critical inputs, support for the reception of allied reinforcements, transport of equipment and personnel and access to personnel with special expertise. The collective defence capability through NATO, including Nordic cooperation, is key to civil society’s support for military efforts (see Section 3.10.1).

The Government will:

• build a common basis for civil preparedness planning to enable civil sectors to support military efforts and handle other undesirable incidents.

• consider common planning assumptions for civil preparedness.

• harmonise national civil plans with military planning.

• assess the need for reinforced cross-sectoral efforts in Troms and Finnmark counties to strengthen civilian resilience in these areas, in dialogue with local and regional actors.

• support a pilot project for bolstering civilian resilience in Finnmark.

• assess the need to strengthen civilian resilience in strategically important geographical areas to be able to maintain fundamental services for the public and to strengthen civilian capability to support military efforts.

• ensure stronger control of the border with Russia.

• consider whether current preparedness legislation contains the necessary authorisations to handle anticipated crisis situations.

• ensure that assessments of legal authority are included as part of contingency plans and training exercises.

• consider the need for separate guidelines for the implementation of legislative and regulatory processes during crises that mean normal procedures cannot be followed due to time constraints.

• ensure that legislation facilitates preparedness of the civil workforce during security policy crises and war.

• further develop military mobility, including by developing a strategic corridor for military mobility through northern Norway, northern Sweden and northern Finland.

10.1 Develop a common basis for preparedness planning in civil sectors

Prevention, preparedness and crisis management capability require knowledge of the incidents that could affect us. Such knowledge is important for identifying vulnerabilities, assessing and prioritising relevant measures, and training in incident management. Knowledge is also crucial for good coordination and utilising society’s collective resources as effectively as possible. Since all major incidents have cross-sectoral consequences, and therefore require that actors in different sectors contribute and cooperate, the necessary planning must be in place for such incidents A common basis is needed for civil preparedness planning.

In war and under the threat of war, national and allied forces will have a particular need for support from civil sectors. Civil sectors must therefore be familiar with military needs. There is currently close cooperation between the Norwegian Armed Forces and civil sectors at the organisational level on preparedness and crisis management, including the need for civilian support. As pointed out in the new long-term defence plan (Proposition No 87 to the Storting (2023–2024)), the communication of military needs must also be strengthened to ensure it flows to all the necessary levels of civil society. As announced in Proposition No 87 to the Storting (2023–2024), the Government will therefore establish fixed procedures to ensure that the need for civilian support for military efforts in accordance with military planning is communicated more systematically and in as specific terms as possible to ministries with sectoral responsibility for total defence. The need for civil support for military efforts is derived from plans, and they are estimates.

Clearer communication of military needs is important for civil society’s ability to assess, decide and implement measures within their respective areas of responsibility. The capability to support military forces requires all sectors to prepare for this in peacetime. Supporting military efforts for the defence of Norway is a social responsibility that is incumbent on all sectors, agencies and actors, both private and public. At the same time as civil sectors have the capability to support military efforts, civil society must be able to maintain critical societal functions and protect the civilian population.

In addition to their capability to support military efforts in accordance with military plans, civil sectors also need to plan for other serious crises. In its first report, the Coronavirus Commission pointed out that pandemic preparedness was not satisfactory, despite the fact that the Directorate for Civil Protection in its analyses of crisis scenarios had assessed a pandemic as the scenario with the highest overall impact. The Directorate for Civil Protection’s scenarios are not factored into preparedness, but the Government will clarify its expectations of how ministries responsible for civil sectors should assess the impact of new and updated crisis scenarios from the Directorate on their own sector.

Based on the above, the Government is clarifying the common foundation for preparedness planning in civil sectors. The purpose is to facilitate the necessary coordination and cross-sectoral assessments, and to ensure that civil sectors are capable of supporting national and allied military efforts in security policy crises and war. In addition, civil society must be resilient enough to maintain critical functions in important areas of society. The common foundation consists of

• estimated military needs for civilian support in accordance with military plans for defending Norway.

• all civil sector ministries being required to document that they have assessed the impact of new and updated crisis scenarios from the Directorate for Civil Protection on their own sector.

In its work on the planning foundation, the Government will consider common assumptions for civil preparedness. These are conditions that may form the basis for the necessary preparedness, and may include, for example, whether restrictions should be imposed on imports and exports, whether certain geographical areas of the country should be prioritised specifically in preparedness work, the capacity for evacuating people in a given situation, or timeframes for how quickly preparedness measures can be established.

Measures related to a common foundation for preparedness planning in civil sectors could have both financial and administrative consequences. Interdependencies and coordination needs between sectors on the civil side must also be clarified, including prioritisation needs. Follow-up by the civil sectors must therefore be systematic and coordinated. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security will, by virtue of its coordinating role in the civil sectors, provide guidelines for this follow-up work. This work will be seen in the context of the work in the new common structure at ministry level for preparedness planning and status assessments in civil sectors, see Section 3.1. This work is coordinated with the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries’ follow-up of supply preparedness, see Section 11.1.

Photo: Ole-Sverre Haugli/Norwegian Armed Forces.

10.2 Military mobility

In Report No 14 to the Storting (2023–2024) National Transport Plan 2025-2036, the Government is taking several steps to adapt the transport sector to a new security policy situation. Several projects and measures during the planning period will support both public security and the military defence of Norway. Measures that safeguard effective military mobility must be taken into account in the planning period. See also Section 3.10.1.

The development and improvement of transport infrastructure is usually both time-consuming and costly, and the planning of major infrastructure projects often takes years. A number of goals and considerations must be weighed against each other in relation to the development of the transport system. In order to take military needs into account, it is important that, as far as possible, these needs are included in the ordinary processes for assessing, planning and prioritising measures and resource use in the transport sector. The Government has therefore decided to establish a clearer framework for interaction between the transport sector and the defence sector, which will clarify and communicate military needs. The framework will facilitate timely, coordinated and relevant input from the defence sector to the transport sector, and thus form part of the basis for priorities in the transport sector, including input to budget processes and future national transport plans.

Strengthening military mobility is an important aspect of exercises and training. The main goal of this work is to facilitate rapid and seamless military movement across borders. Cross-border mobility will facilitate cooperation across national borders, including at the high end of the crisis spectrum.

The work to facilitate military mobility must involve all sectors and organisations that have a responsibility for military mobility, such as Norwegian Customs and the police. Civil sectors contribute by coordinating measures related to securing freight, security of supply, evacuation axes, border control, veterinary services, etc., also in connection with major exercises. Norwegian Customs has formalised border customs cooperation with the EU (through agreements with Sweden and Finland), which gives the agency considerable insight into the various aspects of cross-border traffic and a role in safeguarding Norway’s obligations in cooperation on the border with our neighbouring countries, also in the event of crises, see also Section 5.4.10.

The Government will continue its efforts to further develop military mobility in the Nordic region, including by developing a strategic corridor for military mobility through northern Norway, northern Sweden and northern Finland to help move personnel and materiel from Norwegian ports to Sweden and Finland.

10.3 National Preparedness and Response System

The planning basis described in Section 10.1 is important for the further development of the National Preparedness and Response System (NBS) and underlying plans. NBS is a collective term for the Civil Preparedness and Response System (SBS) and the Defence Sector Preparedness and Response System (BFF). NBS is a cross-sectoral procedure and decision-making tool for central political authorities and individual heads of organisations in the event of a security policy crisis, armed conflict and other cross-sectoral crises. Preparedness planning based on NBS, together with relevant underlying plans, facilitates the capability to respond effectively and interact across military and civil sectors. NBS is harmonised with the NATO Response System to ensure rapid and coordinated decisions between Norway and NATO, but is adapted to national conditions and needs.

Clear and thorough underlying plans in the sectors are a prerequisite for the system having effect. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is responsible for coordinating SBS on the civil side, while the Ministry of Defence is responsible for coordinating BFF in the defence sector. The Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security are jointly responsible for ensuring conformity between BFF and SBS. The Directorate for Civil Protection has a special responsibility to help ensure that underlying civil plans are coordinated.

NATO has revised its response system to ensure it supports the Alliance`s Three Core Tasks, and to make it simpler and clearer. The Government will review NBS in 2025, in line with NATO’s revision.

Photo: Raymond Engmark.

10.4 The High North, the Nordic countries and northern Norway

The High North is Norway’s most important strategic area of interest. The High North comprises the land and maritime areas from southern Helgeland in the south to the Greenland Sea in the west and the Pechora Sea (the south-eastern corner of the Barents Sea) in the east. As pointed out in the new long-term defence plan (Proposition No 87 to the Storting (2023–2024)), the Government aims to contribute to predictability and stability in the High North. In turbulent times in which a growing number of states are showing greater interest in the High North, Norway must be able to understand, influence and shape developments in the region and the Arctic. Safeguarding stability and Norwegian interests will require more of Norway in the years to come, both in civil and military terms. We must expect Russia’s activity in the High North to continue as the area is of strategic military importance to Russia.

Civil resilience must be developed throughout Norway. The security policy situation, seen in the context of NATO’s military planning, national military planning and national conditions, indicates that there are certain geographical areas in Norway that are assumed to be of greater importance for the Norwegian Armed Forces and allied operations in crisis and war, and which therefore require adapted measures. Proposition No 87 to the Storting (2023–2024), cf. Recommendation No 426 to the Storting (2023–2024), stresses that Northern Norway is the Norwegian Armed Forces’ most strategically important operational area and an important hub for allied activity. At the same time, Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO and changes to NATO’s planning framework could mean that other strategic areas of Norway will also play a particularly important role in civilian support for military efforts.

10.4.1 Bolstered civilian resilience in Troms and Finnmark

The changed security situation in Europe has created a new situation on the Schengen border with Russia. It is of paramount interest to national security to ensure credible and adequate civil surveillance and control along this land and sea border, but also in the land areas and in connection with critical infrastructure in Troms and Finnmark.

Settlement, activity and thriving local communities throughout the country are vital for Norway, particularly in the north. The Total Preparedness Commission (Norwegian Official Report (NOU) 2023: 17) highlights the need for a national action zone for preparedness in Troms and Finnmark counties, based on NATO’s baseline requirements of resilience in critical civil society functions. In addition to the economic measures that are part of the existing action zone to stimulate settlement and business activity, this will involve further measures to strengthen preparedness.

The counties of Troms and Finnmark cover large areas, and critical services such as health and social care, police and fire and rescue services can be apart. Some areas are characterised by population decline, ageing, scattered settlement and the disadvantages of great distances for residents and businesses. There is also poorer access to welfare services due to a lack of sufficient and qualified labour. These are challenges that are part of international trends, and not issues that one actor can solve alone. At the same time, they affect the municipalities’ ability to bolster civilian resilience and fulfil their total defence tasks.

Vulnerable supply lines and limited pre-storage of inputs (food, fuel, medicines etc.) can affect emergency preparedness and resilience in Troms and Finnmark, and necessitate assistance from other parts of the country in the event of major incidents. Demanding climatic conditions can challenge resilience and make it more difficult to handle simultaneous incidents. A decentralised organisation of the emergency services is therefore important to the Government, to ensure, among other things, rapid response and local knowledge.

Eastern Finnmark is in a particularly vulnerable position, given its geographical and strategic location on the border with Russia. In addition to being Norway’s national border, it is also NATO’s northernmost border and the outer border of the EU and Schengen area. Incidents such as GPS interference, photos being taken of installations and border activity are constantly being reported.

The Finnish Border Guard has noted that the Russian authorities at the border between Finland and Russia have changed their practice, and now allow travel from Russia to Finland even without the necessary documents. According to the Finnish authorities, it is evident that the Russian authorities, together with other actors, have helped people to illegally cross the border into Finland. Since the influx of migrants in 2015, Finland has also made changes to its legislation that allow for the closure of border crossing points to safeguard its national security.

In response to Russian instrumentalisation of migration, Finland has closed its border crossing points with Russia indefinitely. Finland, the Baltic states and Poland are all prioritising security measures at their borders. The National Police Directorate and the Norwegian Defence Staff have assessed the security level at the border with Russia. A follow-up report from the National Police Directorate in 2024 outlines a number of possible measures related to the assessment of surveillance, detection and emergency response capacities and the capacity to handle border violations. This report is under consideration. The National Police Directorate applied for EU funding for its work on following up the report. The EU awarded Norway Euro 16.4 million to strengthen surveillance of the border with Russia. The Government will ensure stronger control over the border with Russia.

The Government has already initiated work to look at cross-sectoral measures in eastern Finnmark within four main areas: emergency preparedness and security, well-functioning local communities, skills and education, and business development. The work facilitates both professional and political dialogue with local and regional actors, and it will form the basis for measures and priorities in ongoing processes in the sectors. The Government has allocated funding for a pilot project to increase resilience and preparedness in Finnmark (see Box 10.3).

The Government will also endeavour to increase cooperation with Sweden and Finland in the north to contribute to viable civil communities. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council is already working on health and health preparedness. The Government will facilitate and support regional and local initiatives and focus areas that support national public security and emergency preparedness initiatives.

The Government shares the Total Preparedness Commission’s assessment of the need for stronger measures in the north. The Government will assess the need for stronger cross-sectoral efforts in Troms and Finnmark to strengthen civilian resilience in these areas, taking into account NATO’s seven baseline requirements for resilience in critical civil society functions (see Box 3.1). The Government will enter into dialogue with the affected counties and municipalities to assess possible measures to increase the resilience of civil society.

The Government’s goal of vibrant and thriving communities in the north has a clear regional policy rationale, but strong communities in the north are also important for bolstering Norwegian resilience. The Government’s ongoing work related to eastern Finnmark will help strengthen civilian resilience. This work will also contribute to the assessment of whether a similar process can be used to enhance civil resilience in other geographical areas.

10.4.2 Follow-up of other strategically important geographical areas

Strategically important geographical areas may be areas for allied reception, host nation support, corridors for the transport of military material or special needs for evacuation both in Norway and between allies, or areas with important inputs and services. There may also be areas that are particularly vulnerable to impacts and incidents that challenge critical societal functions or critical infrastructure, thereby threatening national security.

The Government will consider what measures need to be implemented to strengthen civilian resilience in these areas, including the possibility of increased cross-border cooperation. Relevant measures in the geographical areas may include strengthening critical infrastructure, more targeted work on self-preparedness, skills development, and facilitating the strengthening of municipal preparedness and holding training exercises for specific scenarios. Other examples include measures that increase security of supply through requirements for transport capacity (available transport resources) and stockpiling, as well as measures that ensure the presence of authorities and other measures that enable secure access to preparedness actors. It may also involve facilitating greater coordination and cooperation between different sectors’ approaches to the municipalities, between the municipalities and other public administration levels, cross-sectoral planning, and training and exercises between the defence sector and civilian actors, without weakening local autonomy. These are relevant measures to strengthen public resilience and the total defence capability to handle crises and war. Nordic cooperation, within the framework of NATO and European cooperation, are important elements in this work.

Several of the measures in question require close cooperation between various sectors and administrative levels. The structure for prevention, preparedness planning and status assessments is therefore an important arena for identifying and implementing measures, see Section 3.1. A common foundation for preparedness planning in civil sectors will also be an important starting point for this work, see Section 10.1.

10.5 Stronger legislation for crisis and war

10.5.1 Preparedness legislation for the entire crisis spectrum

Applicable and forward-looking preparedness legislation is a necessary prerequisite for effective crisis management, and is paramount to both emergency planning and exercises. Current preparedness legislation consists of both cross-sectoral legislation and emergency preparedness provisions in sector-specific legislation. A non-statutory principle of necessity also provides a basis for implementing measures in extraordinary crisis situations. Some of the preparedness powers set out in, for example, Section 3 of the Emergency Preparedness Act, Section 5 of the Public Administration Act and Section 7-12 of the Act relating to control of communicable diseases, may be regarded as a piecemeal codification of the constitutional principle of necessity. Other legal authority for preparedness, such as the legal bases in the Act on Business and Industry Preparedness, the Requisition Act, (rekvisisjonsloven) the Civil Protection Act, the Health Preparedness Act and other authorisation provisions in the Act relating to control of communicable diseases, are important examples of ordinary preparedness powers. The various legal bases for preparedness apply to different parts of the crisis spectrum.

Changes in the security policy and threat situation, the general development of society and experience from the pandemic indicate that the current legal bases should be reviewed to assess whether the legislation provides the necessary legal authority to handle anticipated crisis situations. As pointed out by the Coronavirus Commission, the experiences from the regulatory work during the COVID-19 pandemic provide important learning with transfer value to crises other than pandemics. The need for regulatory changes and new authorisations should, as far as possible, be explored, debated and based on ordinary legislative processes before a crisis occurs. Updated and forward-looking preparedness legislation should provide the necessary legal instruments to handle a crisis, including maintaining fundamental societal functions. It should also, as far as possible, ensure that the measures that can be implemented in the different parts of the crisis spectrum, the procedures for doing so and how citizens’ fundamental rights are to be safeguarded are democratically secured in advance. It is also important to strike the right balance between specific special provisions and more general legal authority, which provides the necessary freedom of action and ability to make rapid changes when needed. The Government is in the process of assessing legislative amendments for important areas and has already proposed legal provisions on civil workforce preparedness, see Section 10.5.2.

The Government will consider whether current preparedness legislation provides the necessary legal authority to handle anticipated crisis situations. Furthermore, the Government will also ensure that assessments of legal authority are included as part of preparedness planning and training exercises. Based on experience from the pandemic, the Government will consider the need for separate guidelines for the implementation of legislative and regulatory processes during crises that mean normal procedures cannot be followed due to time constraints.

Photo: DSB.

10.5.2 Civil workforce preparedness

In a situation where the realm is at war or war is threatening or the independence or security of the realm is in danger the state may need to draw on society’s collective resources to support the defence of the country, safeguard the fundamental functionality of civil society and protect the civilian population.

The most prominent need for civilian labour will be to support the defence of the country. Furthermore, labour will be needed to maintain key civil functions, and this need may increase as a result of the situation, for example as a result of the destruction of critical infrastructure or due to the reallocation of resources to compulsory military service in the Armed Forces or to support Norway’s defence. There may also be a greater need for labour due to foreign workers returning to their home countries as a result of the situation. The situation may also trigger new tasks that need to be addressed by the supply of labour.

The need to be able to draw on society’s collective resources if the realm is at war or war is threatening or the independence or security of the realm is in danger, including in the form of workforce preparedness, has long been stressed, see for example the Norwegian Defence Commission of 1946, Recommendation Part I page 75 and Norwegian Official Report (NOU) 2023: 14 Norwegian Defence Commission of 2021 Section 13.5.4.

Our citizens are the mainstay of our total defence and enable society as a whole to function in security policy crises and war. Industrial and production workers operate the production machines, IT specialists ensure that mobile networks, broadband, online banking and bankcards work, drivers drive the fuel trucks, mechanics repair military tanks, doctors and nurses save lives in the operating theatre, fire and rescue crews put out fires and pull people out of buildings that have collapsed, and maritime pilots guide supply ships carrying allied reinforcements safely to port. A significant proportion of supplies to Norway are transported by sea, which is also where many of the NATO alliance’s crucial supply lines run.

In a situation where the realm is at war or war is threatening or the independence or security of the realm is in danger, access to food, water, electricity and other primary needs may be difficult, and basic infrastructure such as healthcare and ICT may be jeopardised. This will trigger completely different expectations in society as to what the authorities can and cannot do, and what the civilian population can and should do. The focus will shift to the essentials required for society’s functionality.

Although Section 3 of the Emergency Preparedness Act authorises the Government to regulate the labour market in security policy crises and wars, advance regulation will provide more useful authorisations for regulating civil workforce preparedness and guidelines for the assessments that must be made in the situation. Such advance regulation containing authorisation provisions is also in line with the Total Preparedness Commission’s recommendations in Norwegian Official Report (NOU) 2023: 17 The time is now – prepared for an uncertain future, paragraph 31.8.2. This will make it easier for a number of key issues to be decided in advance. Furthermore, advance regulation will more effectively facilitate preparedness planning and training exercises, providing a basis for better preparation and a clearer framework for the actual use of authorisations when the need arises.

The Government will ensure that legislation facilitates the preparedness of the civil workforce if the realm is at war or war is threatening or the independence or security of the realm is in danger. The Government has submitted a proposal to the Storting for amendments to the Civil Protection Act on civil workforce preparedness in security policy crises and war, cf. Proposition No 11 Bill (2024–2025) Amendments to the Civil Protection Act (civil workforce preparedness).

According to the Government’s bill on civil workforce preparedness, a civilian duty to work may not be imposed that involves performing tasks that are considered direct participation in hostilities under international law.

11 Strengthen security of supply

Stable access to goods and services is crucial for society’s resilience and total defence. Supply line failures can affect the ability to maintain continuity in critical societal functions, civilian capability to support military efforts, and the individual community’s and individual citizen’s ability to take care of themselves during crises. Global events will typically be the cause of supply disruption, and international cooperation will therefore often be part of the solution to counter the negative effects of supply disruptions on Norwegian communities.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have highlighted vulnerabilities in global supply lines. Good physical security measures are not sufficient if an organisation’s assets can easily be compromised, whether digitally or through the supply chain. The loss of a subcontractor can have serious consequences, not only for interdependent companies, but also for national security. Climate change can also have negative consequences for security of supply. Vulnerabilities may be linked to reduced access to raw materials/active ingredients, higher lead times (for example as a result of longer transport routes or reduced access to personnel) and increased transport costs.

In light of this, security of supply raises special issues related to roles and responsibilities for high-level situations in the crisis spectrum. A widespread supply disruption, for example related to food, fuel, water or pharmaceuticals, could have extensive negative consequences in all sectors. Difficult prioritisation challenges may also arise across sectors. In addition, the main cause of a supply disruption is likely to be beyond the control of the Norwegian authorities and will require cooperation and intensive coordination with allies and close strategic partners such as the EU.

The Government will:

• conduct a risk, vulnerability and preparedness analysis of the Norwegian food supply.

• assign the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries responsibility for coordinating work on security of supply across sectors, relating to goods and services within the scope of the Act on Business and Industry Preparedness.

• examine the need for, and organisation of, an underlying and sector-neutral system in the area of security of supply.

• take steps to increase cooperation on food security and food preparedness with the Nordic countries.

• stockpile grain for three months’ consumption, increase the degree of agricultural self-sufficiency and ensure strong soil protection.

• reduce our dependence on others for critical goods or functions.

• ensure good cooperation on security of supply with allies and close strategic partners.

• further develop good Nordic cooperation on drinking water preparedness and supply challenges relating to drinking water and wastewater.

11.1 The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries’ responsibility for coordinating work on security of supply

The Government has decided to assign the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries responsibility for coordinating work on security of supply across sectors, relating to goods and services within the scope of the Act on Business and Industry Preparedness. This ensures better control of critical and strategic resources, and supply and value chains. Through knowledge production, guidance, preparation of cross-sectoral strategies and planning documents, among other things, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries will help ensure that the ministries take a comprehensive, systematic and risk-based approach to security of supply in their sectors, and ensure that cross-sectoral issues are dealt with expediently.

The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries will help to ensure that ministries responsible for critical goods and services are prepared for supply crises in the event of war in Norway, and that the ministries have plans in place to support military efforts in such a situation. The complexity of global value chains means that each sector should also plan for supply crises resulting from global events such as geopolitical conflicts and natural disasters. Norwegian businesses that are responsible for critical goods and services should be encouraged to plan alternative supply lines before such scenarios potentially become a reality. For Norway, dialogue and cooperation with allies and other international partners will be vital to enabling Norwegian businesses to support military efforts and society in general during crises.

Extensive work is currently underway on security of supply in many sectors. For example, the pharmaceutical industry tackles around 2,000 shortages a year. This means that the healthcare sector must prioritise between patients and patient groups on a daily basis. This work will continue regardless of the new role assigned to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries.

The Total Preparedness Commission highlights that supply preparedness in crisis and war should contribute to

• supplying the public with the goods and services required to meet their fundamental needs.

• supplying businesses that secure critical societal functions with the goods and services they depend on to maintain their most important deliveries.

• ensuring that the Norwegian Armed Forces have the materials required to perform their tasks.

The Government believes that these three objectives should form the basis for national work on security of supply. In order to improve supply preparedness, the Commission emphasises the need to improve coordination by, among other things, ensuring oversight, well-structured work across sectors and new common planning assumptions. The extended responsibility of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries is an important means of strengthening the work on security of supply. The key tasks assigned to the new coordinating role are to

• assess the need to develop joint strategies across sectors.

• monitor and develop expertise on relevant cross-sectoral issues, including cross-sectoral and simultaneity issues.

• maintain an overview of key vulnerabilities and prioritisation challenges related to cross-sectoral security of supply challenges, and thereby assess their significance for Norwegian security of supply in general.

• facilitate the necessary coordination and exchange of experience with other ministries.

• help ensure that the ministries utilise the potential that lies in collaboration with the business sector.

• maintain a dialogue with the business sector on general issues related to security of supply.

• contribute to raising awareness and providing guidance activities to society at large.

• present cases for the Government when necessary, related to cross-sectoral issues relating to security of supply.

However, the extended responsibility will not change the ministries’ responsibility for security of supply in their own sector. It is still the responsibility of each ministry to contribute to the supply of goods and services to the Norwegian market within its own sector.

The coordination role is limited to industrial preparedness, i.e. goods and services delivered by business and industry. This will include most of the goods and services that society depends on. The role does not currently include the provision of services from the public sector, such as the police, Civil Defence and Food Safety Authority. The role must be based on the Instructions for the Ministries’ work with civil protection and emergency preparedness. Together with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security’s coordinating role for public security, the new role will help make work on security of supply and public security more coherent and comprehensive. This work will be seen in the context of the new council structure for preparedness planning and status assessments in civil sectors, see Section 3.1.

In light of experience from the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, many countries intend to increase their own production to reduce their dependence on other countries. This also applies to Norway. This will change supply lines and may affect the dynamics of international trade. Norway must also emphasise this in its domestic policy. The work on security of supply raises questions about the advantages and disadvantages of stockpiling, and the extent to which functioning international trade systems can still be used as a basis for the work on security of supply. The situation may also differ in different parts of the country. In the north in particular, geographical and climatic conditions mean that the challenges may differ. Norway is a long country with few inhabitants, and this will also have an impact on how we organise measures to strengthen security of supply. Close dialogue and coordination between the defence sector and civil sectors on security of supply is important for resilience and total defence. Awareness of how to handle situations where actors in several sectors are dependent on inputs that are subject to restrictions (simultaneity issues) must also be increased.

Stepping up the work on security of supply follow-up will include assessing various means of safeguarding the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries’ sectoral responsibility, including the need for, and organisation of, an underlying system in the area of security of supply.

Photo: Lise Kaldahl Skreddernes.

11.2 Food supply

Sufficient and safe food is a prerequisite for any society, and, since taking office, the Government has prioritised stepping up Norwegian food production and implementing measures to increase food security. The Norwegian food supply is based on domestic production and distribution of raw materials from agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture, as well as imports of raw materials and finished goods. The Government’s policy of increased self-sufficiency, stockpiling grain and strong soil protection will produce visible results in the form of increased preparedness and security. It is important to continue these initiatives. The channelling policy (geographical distribution of production) is a prerequisite for Norwegian preparedness.

Food preparedness is currently based on domestic production (agriculture and fisheries/seafood), functioning trade systems and safeguarding the production base.

A large proportion of the food items sold in Norway are imported. Today’s food supply is challenged in situations where we cannot supply a sufficient quantity and variety of imported food. The consequences will vary depending on the scope, which inputs, raw materials and products are affected, whether alternative items are available, whether we can and are able to adapt to a new situation, or whether we have measures to deal with this.

Supply preparedness in the food sector is based on both domestic production and imports largely being maintained during crises. The COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recent events in the Taiwan Strait are examples that show that global supply lines are more vulnerable than previously. We have also become more aware of vulnerabilities that were previously not as visible. Current threats, coupled with more extensive climate change and globalisation, mean that we need to assess which common planning assumptions we should use to enable us to safeguard security of supply in different scenarios.

Food security is one of the four main objectives of agricultural policy. Producing enough, safe and varied food of high quality for the population is the primary objective of agriculture. A significant proportion of the food items consumed in Norway is produced by Norwegian agriculture.

In Report No 11 to the Storting (2023–2024) Strategi for auka sjølvforsyning av jordbruksvarer og plan for opptrapping av inntektsmoglegheitene i jordbruket (Strategy for increased self-sufficiency in agricultural produce and plan for escalation of income opportunities in agriculture – in Norwegian only), cf. Recommendation No 258 to the Storting (2023–2024), a self-sufficiency target of 50% has been set, adjusted for imports of feed materials. A majority of the Storting endorsed the target in its consideration of the report and the target is scheduled to be achieved by 2030. The report also addresses the fact that increased income opportunities are a key instrument for achieving the agricultural policy, goals including food security and increased self-sufficiency.

Textbox 11.1 Pilot for a stronger defence through increased food preparedness

Innlandet county authority intends to establish a pilot that facilitates increased use of regional resources to reduce vulnerability and increase food supply preparedness. The pilot will map vulnerabilities based on different scenarios and include food supply in contingency plans at all levels. The project is also seen in the context of the need for nutritious food for Norwegian soldiers, and a dialogue has been established with the Norwegian Armed Forces about this. It will also make expedient plans for resilience in peacetime to provide better security in times of crisis. Through the pilot, Innlandet will work strategically to increase interaction between the food value chains and the preparedness system, as a means of strengthening total defence. Food chains are complex systems with a wide range of essential functions in the form of expertise, technology, organisation, logistics and inputs etc. These functions must work together in peace and crisis.

Photo: Anne Berit Lein/FMLA Nord-Trøndelag.

Stockpiling grain is important for food security and reducing vulnerability in the event of an extraordinary supply crisis. As announced in Proposition No 1 to the Storting (2023–2024), the Government decided that stockpiles of grain equivalent to three months’ consumption should be established. The stockpiles will be built up with 15,000 tonnes of grain per year up to 82,500 tonnes. The first contracts were signed at the end of June 2024, with a duration of 25 years.

The National Audit Office of Norway and the Total Preparedness Commission both stress that the risk and vulnerability analysis for food security must be updated. They also highlight the potential for reorganising production and consumption in a crisis situation and call for an analysis of Norway’s supply and self-sufficiency capability in different crisis situations. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food will ensure such an analysis is carried out. The analysis will be an important management tool in the work to strengthen Norway’s food preparedness.

The Government will appoint a committee to look at the food system of the future. The committee will identify opportunities, dilemmas and challenges in the Norwegian food system. Key national and international objectives and commitments of importance to the food system must be considered in context and form the basis for this work. This can include public health, climate, environment and nature, agriculture, aquaculture, fisheries and food policy, and business and regional policy.

11.3 Drinking water supply

A safe water supply is a fundamental national function. Loss of water and contamination of water can lead to loss of life and health. A prolonged loss of water may trigger the need for evacuation. NATO’s expectations of member states include a resilient water supply. Emergency preparedness in the water and wastewater sector is closely linked to other preparedness in the municipality and the region. Most major waterworks in Norway are owned by municipalities. The Government has adopted national goals for water and health with a cross-sectoral implementation plan. The follow-up of these goals will contribute to a more resilient water supply and better preparedness.

Report No 5 to the Storting (2023–2024) A Resilient Health Emergency Preparedness, cf. Recommendation No 220 to the Storting (2023–2024), describes how the Government is clarifying the Norwegian Food Safety Authority’s coordinating role in security and safe drinking water by establishing a committee to that end. The committee will be chaired by the Norwegian Food Safety Authority and consist of other agencies, one large and one small municipality, county governor and the special interest organisation for the Norwegian water industry, Norsk Vann. The report also discusses how Norway, Sweden and Finland use a lot of surface water for drinking water production and therefore need large quantities of water treatment chemicals for both drinking water and wastewater. The countries also have companies that are important in a Scandinavian and European context to ensure access to and production of water treatment chemicals. Nordic cooperation on emergency preparedness challenges in the field of drinking water has been stepped up in recent years, and is funded by, among others, the Nordic Council of Ministers. The Government will further strengthen this cooperation.

11.4 Security of supply on Svalbard

Svalbard is not connected to a larger, external water or energy system. This underlines the importance of having adequate local emergency preparedness for critical infrastructure. Svalbard relies on the importation of virtually everything that is used on the archipelago, including food and other consumer goods, medicines, fuel and spare parts. This makes Longyearbyen vulnerable to supply line disruptions. The Governor of Svalbard, by virtue of their authority, has coordinating responsibility for public security and emergency preparedness in Svalbard. This includes security of supply. The Governor of Svalbard has established plans regarding security of supply.

Electricity and heating are essential for maintaining the population and businesses in Longyearbyen. Vast distances to the mainland and climatic conditions entail that considerations such as security of supply and a stable energy supply must be given particular emphasis. The Government’s intention is for the state to take greater responsibility for the power supply in Longyearbyen, e.g. through the company Store Norske, and that responsibility for the power supply shall be clarified as soon as possible.

In connection with the revised national budget for 2024, the Government proposed, and the Storting approved, allocations totalling NOK 45 million to help increase security of supply for energy and water in Longyearbyen. The funds have been earmarked for investments in infrastructure to strengthen security of supply and redundancy of energy in Longyearbyen, and government co-financing of a pilot project to establish a reserve drinking water source in Longyearbyen.