PRIME MINISTER JAN P. SYSE

INTERVENTION AT THE NATO SUMMIT MEETING, LONDON 5 JULY 1990

Mr. Chairman,

I have always thought that the best eloquence is the one which gets things done. We all agree that the Alliance must be one of the main elements in the new European architecture. Then it must also play a leading role in putting that architecture together. A major contribution has to come from this meeting. The draft statement from President Bush forms a promising basis for that contribution. It contains the kind of eloquence that gets things done.

As we proceed, unpredictability will be a constant companion. That applies in particular to the situation in the Soviet Union. We must make it clear that we do want the Soviet Union firmly integrated in common structures of security and cooperation.

These basic considerations must now be translated into concrete steps. For our meeting that means the following:

First, the Alliance should provide greater transparency with regard to its own activities. Visits by Soviet and Eastern European leaders - and neutral and non-aligned leaders for that matter - would be a valuable confidence-building measure. Liaison offices would be a useful

instrument. Such measures - as suggested by President
Bush - would convey the image of an Alliance determined
to provide stability not only for its 16 members, but
for Europe as a whole. And they would contribute to
a wider European acceptance of that role.

- Second, the Alliance must demonstrate its willingness to adjust its strategy to changing political and military realities. I stress the word <u>realities</u>. We must make sure that we are responding to real and not to hoped-for changes. And we must make sure that such adjustments lead to more security for each and every ally. I agree with President Bush that we should seek a shift of emphasis towards making nuclear weapons weapons of last resort.
- And third, we must declare our readiness to transform
 the CSCE from a process to a permanent framework, by
 creating the first institutions and the machinery required
 for a regular political dialogue.

Such measures would hopefully bring us closer to Soviet acceptance of vital allied objectives, first and foremost the NATO membership of a united Germany. And let me here express my admiration and full support to Chancellor Kohl in his truly historic efforts.

Change is nothing new to the Alliance. NATO has constantly

evolved and must continue to do so. Our approach is totally different from that of Mr. Ligachev, who according to the Daily Telegraph this week said: "Why is there a severe lack of agricultural produce in the country when the party's agrarian policies are absolutely correct?" We must, however, all the time remember that the produce of NATO has been a total success. So, when we change the Alliance it is in order to preserve it, to paraphrase the words of Edmund Burke.

There is today broad agreement that the political dimension of the Alliance must be further developed. This should be clearly expressed in our statement from this meeting. I should add that much has already been done in this respect. As the political cooperation of the European Community also grows, we must ensure that the two organizations do not act as competitors but as partners, supplementing each other. NATO must remain the principal forum for the trans-atlantic dialogue, as Prime Minister Thatcher also emphasized.

There is a tendency to talk about the political and military dimension of the Alliance as if they could be considered separately from each other. Such a view is simply incorrect. Our political and military activities are intervowen. If we neglect the military dimension, the result may in fact be that the political dimension gradually also becomes weaker.

The military developments have not been equally positive in all parts of Europe. Undoubtedly, Norway benefits from the

improved situation in Central Europe. But the military situation in our own area remains basically unchanged. Our present arrangements for support and reinforcement have not become less relevant, less important. They must be maintained.

Furthermore, while the concept of forward defence will clearly have to be adapted to changing circumstances, it is vitally important from the Norwegian point of view that we remain dedicated to the collective defence of all the territory of all Alliance members.

We should also avoid a situation where a withdrawal of forces from Central Europe leads to a build-up in the North or in the South. This is a particular challenge to our Vienna negotiators.

From our point of view it is also important that land-based naval aircraft are included in a CFE treaty. They pose a serious threat to our lines of reinforcement. Setting them aside would create a serious potential for circumvention. We have already seen graphic proof of this. Thus, 40 Soviet Air Force fighter bombers have recently been redeployed from Hungary to the Kola Peninsula near the Norwegian border. And they have been transferred to Soviet Naval Aviation. Acceptance of the Soviet demand that land-based naval aircraft be excluded from a CFE treaty would create a dangerous loophole.

A declaration on the relations between the members of the two Alliances could be an important means of making German NATO

membership more palatable to the Soviets. But we must avoid treating the two Alliances as if they were equals. We must make sure that such an arrangement corresponds to the interest of our new partners in Central and Eastern Europe. And finally, a declaration should be open to accession by the NNAs.

Mr. Chairman, building a new European architecture cannot be a matter for the members of the two Alliances alone. The neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe have to be involved. The CSCE provides the framework for this involvement. of course, the CSCE cannot carry the burden of European security in the full sense. That can only be done by NATO. But the CSCE will be an important vehicle for the construction of a new and stable European order.

We support the elements listed by President Bush. But another element is required: Meeting the environmental challenge will be a crucial part of our search for stability. The recent op:nion poll in the Federal Republic, published in the last issue of The Economist, confirms that environmental pollution is considered to be by far the most serious problem confronting us. A regional environmental strategy is urgently required.

But we lack the proper tools. A framework has to be established for the negotiation and the implementation of such a strategy. The CSCE should be used for that purpose, in close cooperation with the ECE and with the newly created European Environmental Agency.

We also need a binding environmental "code of conduct" with provisions for exchange of information and for monitoring of transboundary environmental risks. Again the CSCE should provide the framework.

Mr. Chairman, during another conference recently one delegate said: "We do not expect you to be heroic. We only expect you to be bold." That could also be said about our meeting. It is my hope that agreement can be reached which allows this boldness to be reflected in the declaration from this meeting.