

Notification of a temporary reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders

1. Notification submitted by:

Norway

2. Date of the notification:

11 April 2025

3. Date and duration of the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 27(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

12 May 2025 – 11 November 2025

4. Scope of the proposed reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders, specifying at which part or parts of the internal borders border control will be reintroduced or prolonged (Article 27(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

Ferry arrivals from Schengen

5. Notification for a:

- first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event): Article 25a(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399
- prolongation of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event): Article 25a(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

- first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399
- prolongation of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal

borders.

- prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

- prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years and 6 months, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

- reintroduction of border control at internal borders in accordance with a Council Implementing Decision: Article 28(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

NB: A continuation of a reintroduction of border control at the internal borders does not have to be considered a prolongation if the serious threat to public policy or internal security upon which it is based is different from the serious threat that motivated the preceding reintroduction of border control at the internal border. If this is the case, please notify for a first reintroduction and specify the new and distinct nature of the serious threat to public policy or internal security under 7.

6. If the notification for a foreseeable event is made less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 25a(4), (5) and (6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

Please indicate when the circumstances giving rise to the need to reintroduce or prolong border control at internal borders became known.

7. Serious threat to public policy or internal security, consisting of:

- terrorist incidents or threats, and threats posed by serious organised crime

- large-scale public health emergencies

- an exceptional situation characterised by sudden large-scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals, within the meaning of Article 25(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

- Large scale or high-profile international event

- Other

Norway has an important role in assuring European security as producer and supplier of energy to European Allies and must, both nationally and in cooperation with Allies, apply measures to secure this supply.

In this respect, the threat of sabotage in general is of great concern.

The Norwegian Police Security Service assess that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West continue to characterise the threat situation in Norway.

In addition to extensive, continuous intelligence and influence operations, there is an increased likelihood that Russian intelligence services will try to carry out sabotage operations in Norway. It is further underlined that the Police Security Service finds it **likely** that Russian intelligence will try to carry out such actions against targets in Norway in 2025.

The purpose of any actions against targets in Norway will be to prevent us from making deliveries to Ukraine or to negatively influence public opinion on support for Ukraine. The targets of any actions in Norway will probably be similar to what we have seen in Europe. In addition, Norwegian-owned energy infrastructure may also be a target for sabotage in the year ahead. Whether, how and the extent to which this will happen depends, among other things, on Russia's intentions and on how the war in Ukraine unfolds

In accordance with the Commission recommendation on proportionate police checks and police cooperation in the Schengen area of 12th of May 2017, Norway has been carrying out intensified police checks in the areas of Viken region bordering on Sweden. The Norwegian and Swedish police authorities have a very good bilateral cooperation. However, such measures cannot fully substitute internal border controls in the Norwegian ports.

8. Names of authorised border crossing points

Ports with ferry-arrivals from Schengen, at present the harbours in Oslo, Sandefjord, Larvik, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen.

9. Measures taken by other Member States (if applicable)

Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, the UK and Denmark have last year agreed on a Joint Declaration on cooperation regarding protection of critical infrastructure in the North Sea. They cooperate on security measures, share information and knowledge and report relevant information at operational level.

10. Assessment of necessity and proportionality under Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

10.1 Appropriateness: explanation how the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is likely to adequately remedy the threat

The Norwegian Police emphasizes the value the intelligence gathered in connection to the controls have in order to mitigate the threats confronting Norway and that there are no other means that can compensate for the controls. The Police therefore recommends continuation of the controls.

The Norwegian Police also underlines the effect the controls have in countering attempts of foreign malign actors to travel to Norway.

10.2 Explanation why the objectives pursued by the reintroduction cannot be obtained by:

Introducing controls at internal borders allows the collection of advance passenger data.

10.3 Likely impact on the movement of persons within the area without internal border control and the functioning of cross-border regions

The controls are targeted and have minimal impact on traffic flow.

10.4 If the serious threat consists of sudden large-scale unauthorised movements (Article 25(1), point (c), and 27(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

10.5 Opinion of the Commission and consultation process (if applicable)

11. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 6 months in accordance with Article 25a(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Article 27(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

11.1 Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

11.2 Scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat

Please elaborate on the scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat, in particular:

- *how long the serious threat is expected to persist;*
- *which sections of the internal borders may be affected;*
- *information regarding coordination measures with other Member States impacted or likely to be impacted by the border control at internal borders.*

12. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for a major exceptional situation (Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399).

12.1 Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

The border controls will be limited in scope, both operationally and geographically, to what is strictly necessary to prevent possible threats to the internal security and public policy. The controls will be targeted and based on risk assessment, and carried out in accordance with the Commission guidelines for border management issues. Furthermore, the controls will be limited to ports with ferry connections to the Schengen Area.

12.2 Action taken in response to an opinion of the Commission issued in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)

12.3 Action taken in response to a consultation process initiated in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)

12.4 Substantiation of the continued threat to public policy or internal security

12.5 Explanation why alternative measures are ineffective

12.6 Presentation of mitigating measures

12.7 Where appropriate: presentation of the means, actions, conditions and timeline with a view to lifting border control at internal borders

13. Any further information (optional)

14. Withholding of information on grounds of public security (Article 27(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

15. Confidentiality of information (Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)